Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s European puzzle

Four Danish opt-outs, one Danish Prime Minister and one European Council Presidency (1/2)

Are the Danes going to vote yes this time ? A French friend of mine asked me this simple, yet difficult, question when contemplating the perspective of a Danish referendum on the Danish opt-outs. A few moments later he formulated an equally difficult question : Will the name of the first President of the European Council be Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen if the Lisbon treaty is ratified ? It may not seem obvious but the two questions are intrinsically linked. Over two articles the Euros take on these two questions. This, the first article, seeks to answer the first question by outlining the level of parliamentary and public support for suppressing the opt-outs. The second article, which follows shortly, will discuss which referenda strategy Rasmussen may opt for to secure a yes and how this relates to the chance of Rasmussen becoming the first Council President.

The four opt-outs were secured at Edinburgh in 1993 in the aftermath of the notorious Danish “Nej” (No) to the Maastricht treaty in 1992. After the Liberal-Conservative coalition government won the elections for the third consecutive time in November last year they included a referendum in the political program.

While promising a referendum Mr. Rasmussen did, however, refrain from saying anything as to which opt-outs the Danes should vote on and when. Mr. Rasmussen only opened the floor with a couple of small steps on the spot and then quickly took to a comfortable chair. From this position he has since then quietly watched the other political parties and stakeholders in the EU-debate who eagerly took to the floor that the head of government had opened, as they positioned themselves in relation to the opt-outs. When occasionally pausing, asking Mr. Rasmussen if he planned to submit all the opt-outs for referendum and if so at the same time, the Prime Minister has calmly replied that he “has not thought about that yet”. The first priority, he insists is to prepare the bill that ratifies the Lisbon treaty.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen wants a referenda

The Danish Prime Minister has promised the electorate another vote on the opt-outs in this election periode.

In a similar move the government has asked a the Danish Institute for International Studies to asses the consequences of the opt-outs. The report is due August this year. Only hereafter will the PM take a position. This typical processual style has won Mr. Rasmussen many political victories by turning politics into process. In this case the PM has managed to dodge the demands of other political actors for a clear indicator as to how the referendum-process will be organized. Instead he has had time to read the political landscape and develop his strategy while ensuring that the actual debate does not kick off too early.

So how does the political landscape look then ? The nationalist right-wing Danish People’s Party and the radical socialist Red-Green Alliance are not surprisingly against more Danish integration. To them abolishing the opt-outs equals respectively further loss of sovereignty and submission to a capitalist project. Mr. Rasmussen did not expect otherwise. Contrarily the government coalition can count on the Social-Democrats, the Social-Liberal Party and New Alliance, which are all eager to see the opt-outs left behind. The last party in the Danish parliament is the Socialist Party, which historically have been opposed to EU-membership. Although internally torn by the EU-question the party today officially takes a pragmatic case-by-case approach to EU-questions. The Socialist Party is the dark horse in Mr. Rasmussen’s strategy. The party carries more weight in EU-questions than in domestic politics as many eurosceptic social-democrats support the socialist line. The Danish referenda experience suggests that the pro-European parties can not take on the Socialist Party and the Danish People’s Party at the same time. The support of the Socialist Party would therefore be crucial to securing a “Ja” (Yes). In line with their case-by-case approach the Socialists asses each opt-out differently, which renders the strategic situation complex to say the least.

"No thanks"

Pia Kjærsgaard and her Danish People’s Party is not too found of the idea of a referendum.

The first opt-out concerns the European citizenship. With the creation of the European Union with Maastricht many Danes feared that EU-citizenship would overrule Danish ditto as “EU-legislation takes preference over national legislation” as it was stated in the 92 debate. With the Amsterdam treaty, which stipulated that EU-citizenship was supplemental to national citizenship, this opt-out became obsolete. Nevertheless, a referendum is formally needed for the opt-out to be abolished. A “Ja” should be within reach as all political parties agree that the opt-out has lost its relevance.

The second opt-out concerns the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Danes generally support deploying troops on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions but in 1992 many Danes feared a European military super state. Since history has shown otherwise and most missions are organized within the CFSP-frame, such as the KFOR-force in Kosovo, Danes find the opt-out increasingly problematic. Villy Søvndal, leader of the Socialists, has expressed support for Danish participation in the CFSP but has made it a condition that a political statement is annexed to the Danish adhesion, which would exempt Denmark from potential non-UN-supported EU-missions. The government and the Socialists should, though, be able to reach an agreement. Mr. Rasmussen wants it, Mr. Søvndal wants it and the Danes want it. Support for adhesion to the CFSP is running at around 60-65% with only 25-30 % against and 10% in doubts. Rasmussen has a “Ja” within reach.

Maybe...

Villy Søvndal and his Socialist Party take a case-by-case stand on EU-issues and their stand on the opt-outs vary with the individual opt-out.

The third opt-out, on parts of the cooperation on Justice and Home Affaires (JHA), is where it gets politically complicated. Commissioner Frattini’s area consists largely of three policy areas. Firstly are asylum, immigration and border control. Secondly, judicial corporation in civil matters and thirdly police cooperation and criminal justice. The history of the opt-out is best summarised with the notion of ‘Fortress Europe’. In the early 90’s Danish immigration policy was liberal and the political left looked with suspicion to the envisaged transfer of competences to the EU in the Maastricht treaty. They feared a self-sufficient, xenophobic and exclusive ‘Fortress Europe’ enclosed around itself. Consequently, when the Edinburgh agreement was hammered out in 1993 the Socialists insisted on an opt-out from supranational cooperation in JHA.

With the 1999 Amsterdam treaty the opt-out was activated when asylum, immigration and border control and judicial corporation in civil matters were converted to supranational policy-areas with quality majority voting in the Council in most areas, European Court of Justice oversight and Commission right of initiative. With the Lisbon treaty JHA becomes fully supranational, which leaves Denmark without European partners on transnational phenomena such as organised crime, immigration and terrorism, which most Danish politicians regret. The irony of history has it, however, that today it is the Right who is reluctant of abolishing the opt-out. The Right wishes to uphold the tough immigration policy compared to which EU-immigration standards are liberal. Meanwhile the Left now seeks desperately to rescue Danish immigration policy from the Danes by anchoring it safely and securely with its European partners.

Consequently, the liberal-conservative government has negotiated an opt-in clause in the Lisbon treaty, which ensures that Denmark can participate in JHA and keep the tough immigration policy at the same time. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, Denmark can change its JHA opt-out from a complete opt-out to the case-by-case opt-in version applying to Ireland and the United. This is a very bad idea according to the Socialists who seeks full Danish participation in JHA. The Danish PM knows, however, that a tough immigration has weighed in heavily on the last three elections in favour of Mr. Rasmussen’s right side of the parliament. Hence he seems unlikely to give in to the Socialist demand. And should he do so it is not unlikely that the Danes will say “thank you” but “Nej” (No). Only half of the 80% of the Danes who have made up their mind support abolishing the opt-out. Hardly a reassuring situation for Mr. Rasmussen as the Danish experience shows that the No-camp is always trailing behind the Yes-camp in the beginning but on election day has won some 10-15% during the campaign.

As for the last opt-out on the Euro, things are simpler for Mr. 

Do they want it this time ?

The Danes voted no to the euro in 2000. At present a majority of the Danes support introducing the euro but so did they before the referendum campaign in 2000.

Rasmussen. In 1992 As late as in 2000 53% of the Danes said no thanks to replacing their ‘Krone’ with the Union’s Euro. The Socialists have made it clear that they can in no way support a “Ja” to the Euro which, in their view, will lead to price increases and furthermore is a part of a too rigorous and unsocial European monetary policy. As for the Danes they are generally favourable of introducing the euro with polls showing some 55% in favour and 40% against. That could, however, change quickly in a referendum campaign - and Anders Fogh Rasmussen knows this.

Are the Danes then going to vote “Ja” this time ? The analysis above suggests that submitting all opt-outs for referendum at the same time seems unwise as such a strategy would force the Socialists to recommend a “Nej”. For this reason Mr. Rasmussen’s government finds itself in a strategically difficult situation. The government will have to place its bets on conducting several referenda on the individual opt-outs potentially linking two of them. Whether the Danes are ready to leave the opt-outs behind is therefore dependent on the referendum-strategy chosen. Which strategy the PM seems more likely to pursue and how the opt-outs relate to Mr. Rasmussen’s president aspirations are the themes of the next article. Stay tuned.